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COMMENT
RICHARD E. MORGAN*

The birds were singing and the ice cubes were tinkling and the
canap6s were circulating briskly. It was a garden reception following ajune wedding. It was one of those "legal weddings"-both the
bride and groom were young attorneys (one a former student of
mine), and many of the guests were young attorneys too (friends
from law school, clerkships, and first jobs). I found myself chatting
with an obviously able recent graduate of one of our elite law
schools. After learning that I taught constitutional law he confided
that, while he had never been a terribly hardworking student in law
school, he had won the prize in constitutional law the year he had
taken the course. The subject had "turned him on," he said, "because it had so little to do with law." "Constitutional law," he announced brightly, "is moral philosophy, pure and simple"; no one
with any pretense to sophistication could think otherwise. "And,"
he continued, "all that stuff about the framers and the intentions of
the framers-well, all the past really tells us is to try to do the right
thing!"
It was in that spirit, he told me-obeying the injunction to "try
to do the right thing"-that he wrote his final examination in constitutional law for which he received the top grade in the course. I do
not mean to mock my acquaintance. While his chosen field is something safe like estate planning, his outlook is shared, if the truth
were told, by many practicing constitutional scholars and commentators. His expression of it was remarkable only for its insouciance
and clarity. This is the measure of our difficulty. The twin notions
that constitutional law is "moral philosophy pure and simple," and
that our constitutional tradition is so multifaceted and ambiguous
that all that can be extracted from it is "try to do the right thing,"
have become a conventional wisdom into which several generations
of constitutional "experts" have been socialized. (Professor Cox is
uneasy in the face of this conventional wisdom, but he appears to
temporize with it. I do not think my chance acquaintance would get
an A from Cox, but I fear he might get an A-.)
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Constitutional Law and Government,
Bowdoin College. A.B., Bowdoin College, 1959; M.A., Columbia University, 1961;
Ph.D., 1967.
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For weeks I had been trying to think through the organization
of a book on the origins and dangers of the conventional wisdom
concerning the American Constitution. Topics and chapters were
falling into place, yet I had not hit upon the proper voice or title.
But from that moment at the garden party the book became The Crists of American Constitutionalism.
I.
In our supremely verbal but decreasingly literate age there are
many previously serviceable words that one is almost embarrassed
to use. "Crisis" is one of these. By resorting to it I am saying more
than that there is conflict at present over the direction of American
constitutionalism, or that there are some particularly interesting intellectual problems with respect to it. I use "crisis" according to its
first meaning in The Oxford English Dictionary: "[tihe point in the progress of a disease when a change takes place which is decisive of
recovery or death."' It is precisely the case that over the course of
the next few years the principled core of traditional American constitutionalism either will be reasserted or will be finally abandoned
and become archaic.
Certainly, everything is not wrong with contemporary constitutional law, but a lot is. And the flaws, it turns out, usually have to do
precisely with the intellectual provenance of the Court's decisions.
Supreme Court majorities have often abandoned reasonably clear,
relatively well-accepted, and quite serviceable constitutional meanings to strike out in new directions that could not be justified or
explained on the basis of what had gone before. There has been
reliance by majority Justices, sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit, on bits and pieces of fashionable ideology that lack deep rooting in American political culture. Many decisions were based, not
on the body of ideas which alone could legitimate, but on theories
which a majority of the country never shared.
Some of the most important initiatives of the recent past were
perfectly susceptible of justification on traditional, interpretive
grounds. Katz v. United States,2 which altered the paradigm for determining fourth amendment violations from one based on physical
spaces to one based on reasonable expectations of privacy, was such
an innovation. As Judge Bork put it: "It is not the notion that
judges may apply a constitutional provision only to circumstances
1. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1178 (1933).
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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specifically contemplated by the framers; ... we are able to apply
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures to electronic surveillance Uust as] we apply the commerce
clause to state regulations of interstate trucking." 3 Contrary to Professor Cox's suggestion that a jurisprudence of original intention
implies "that the Court should confine the grants of federal power
and the guarantees of individual rights to the particular instances
that the framers specifically had in mind,"4 I know of no originalist
who takes that position. Other famous, recent Supreme Court outcomes were supremely right, but based on insubstantial or fragmentary rationales-which were breeding grounds for future doctrinal
mischief. Brown v. Board of Education,5 which gave rise to Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg,6 is the example of examples. Still other decisions which were right in responding to a modern danger overshot
the mark. New York Times v. Sullivan7 is on point here. But with all
that said, a number of other innovations have been simply wrongwrong in the sense of lacking any intellectually creditable claim to
legitimacy. These include the ones that Professor Cox strains hardest to justify: strict separationism in establishment jurisprudence;
one person, one vote; and the application of higher-level equal protection scrutiny to sex classifications.
II.
I have said enough to make it clear how different my appreciation of the present state of constitutional law is from that of Professor Cox, who writes that the Court has "usually avoided the
extremes of either judicial activism or judicial restraint,"8 and that
all of the innovations of the 1960s and 1970s, "except the abortion
rulings, can be shown to have had adequate roots in our evolving
constitutional tradition."' What is interesting, I think, is not how
3. R. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent and Economic Rights (Nov. 18, 1985)
(address before the University of San Diego Law School), quoted in N.Y. Times, July 2,
1987, at A22, col. 2.
4. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: JudicialActivism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REv.
118, 130 (1987).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (segregated public education denies equal protection of the
law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
6. 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (allowing court-ordered busing to implement school
desegregation).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (denying damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct).
8. Cox, supra note 4, at 118-19.
9. Id.at 129.
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radically we differ but why we differ; what accounts for such differences of perception?
I suggest that contemporary perceptions of the Court and the
state of contemporary constitutional law are controlled by the answers one gives to two questions. First, what kind of a thing is the
Constitution of the United States? Second, what justifies judicial
review?
For as long as I can remember being taught by other people
about the Constitution (and that is a long time), they have been telling me what the Constitution is not: it is not a commercial contract;
it is not the fine print in a municipal bond issue; and it is not a state
constitution, spelling out every minor item. It was as if by saying
what the Constitution wasn't they were making clear what it was.
On the positive side, by contrast, there was usually only the oracular
Marshallian pronouncement that "we must never forget, that it is a
constitution we are expounding,"' 0 or in the deathless Jacksonian jape
"expanding." None of this helps very much.
What the Constitution really is is a kind of intergenerational
deal we make with ourselves. Or, to alter the figure of speech, the
Constitution represents a set of extraordinary political victories by
extraordinary majorities expressing themselves in the most fundamental idiom of public policy. It is a fundamental idiom because it
is assumed that these extraordinary majorities of the past have the
power to trump contemporary majorities. We don't refrain from interfering with freedom of speech because God tells us to, or because
the neo-Kantians think it "the right thing to do," but because we
made a deal with ourselves not to do it.
Deals, even fundamental deals, must have terms. And terms
must be more or less explicable. Clarity is not required-certainly
not the preternatural pellucidity that Chief Justice Marshall claimed
for the Constitution in Marbury v. M'adison," which allows us all to
make fun of him in our first lecture every September. There are
ambiguities in deals, humble and solemn, and these are not necessarily fatal to the deal or the enterprise of construing deals. There
can be good faith differences (of the most bitter sort) over interpreting the terms of a deal. What is fatal to the concept of a deal, and
portends so darkly for the future of constitutionalism in America, is
the notion that the key terms are so confused or have meaning only
10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in
original).
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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at such a high level of generality as to make interpretation impossible. For we can only have an intergenerationally binding deal, reflecting big, solemn, majority victories, if we can go back to those
victories, set ourselves intellectually inside the winning coalition,
and discern with some reasonable specificity what people at the time
thought had been won. (No, the Constitution is not a commercial
contract, but it is a lot more like one than it is like, say, the Nicene
Creed or the later poems of C61ine.)
And the answer to the second question is like unto this. Constitutional review can only be justified as the enforcement of a past,
extraordinary majority against a majority of the moment. Legislative
victories are always deserving of respect, but yield to those anterior
agreements that we made with ourselves in the mode of "We the
People." This is the justification for judicial review in The Federalist
No. 78,12 James Wilson's law lectures at the College of Philadelphia,'" and in Marbury v. Madison. 4 It is the only one that will do.
No substitutes are possible. Not only do history and custom exclude
them, they are logically excluded-no other justification can be reconciled to the commitment to self-government on which our primary constitutional edifice rests. There are no legally enforceable
rights in America except those we consciously, purposefully create
for ourselves.
III.
Now these two fundamental points-the Constitution as an intergenerationally binding deal, and constitutional review as past majorities trumping contemporary ones-have two inescapable
implications for judges who must undertake the task of constitutional construction.
First, judges should stay close to the past political victory in
level of abstraction. Their analysis need not be bound by the particular items that the winning constitutional coalition had specifically
in mind (the point dealt with earlier), but it must be bound by the
discrete purposes and aims of that winning coalition. For instance,
the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment were addressing the needs of newly freed black people, but that does not
mean that only racial classification directed against blacks violates
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
13. For a compliation of these lectures, see THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
14. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the equal protection clause. The manifest concern of the winners of
1866-1867 was with race, and, because that term was not precisely
limited for them, there is sufficient scope for including Justice
Strong's "naturalized Celtic Irishmen"' 5 within the reach of equal
protection. But to abstract the original concern with race and racelike characteristics and to proscribe state classifications based on
other sorts of differences among people is to drain the past political
victory of meaning and leave it an empty vessel-ready for whatever
meaning contemporary advocates might wish to pour into it.
Second, if this sort of mid-range analysis of the past majoritynot literal but not highly generalized either-fails to discover anything that speaks to the case at bar, then the party relying on the
Constitution loses and the contemporary majority preference remains in effect. To strike it without a sufficiently specific predicate
established on the basis of the past constitutional-political outcome
is a species of tyranny.
IV.
As Judge Bork's recent nomination proves, the conflict continues to rage around us. Professor Cox asks whether "in the end" the
Court of the 1960s and 1970s "went too far, too fast, too often in
shaping constitutional law to what the majority of the Justices supposed to be the needs of a just and humane society, and, therefore,
undermined the sources of their own legitimacy."' 6 He fears "that
they created grave risk," but the ultimate answer to the question of
legitimacy appears, to him, to depend on whether the effort at
"counter-reform" led by President Reagan and Attorney General
Meese creates widespread cynicism-a cynicism which sees the
Court as "just another political body"17 and not an entity which
makes its decisions "according to law."'
This seems to me to come perilously close to saying that, while
the Warren and early Burger Courts risked the institution's legitimacy by adventurism in the cause of majority notions of good public
policy, all can still be well if the pesky critics of this behavior will
simply stop calling attention to it. Indeed, Professor Cox has even
more to ask of those critics. He cautions that "the [newly minted]
constitutional rights to which political conservatives object are now
so much a part of the fabric of existing law that changing them
15. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
16. Cox, supra note 4, at 134.
17. Id.
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would be making new law to suit the policy preferences."'" By implication, new appointees are asked to respect the decisions made by
their predecessors to suit their policy preferences and refrain from
introducing instability into constitutional law (and breeding popular
cynicism) by engaging in the same practice themselves! In one
sense, this is breathtaking. For defenders of Warren era activism
now to talk solemnly about respect for precedent and settled law
represents what can only be called an exercise in high chutzpahsoaring far beyond the boy who kills his parents and asks pity as an
orphan.
And yet at a fundamental level the point lies. The avoidance of
radical discontinuity in constitutional law is something of concern
for those persons usually lumped together as conservatives. And
those who inveighed in the wilderness against the like-heartedly innovative judicial styles so praised in the 1960s and 1970s will hardly
want to initiate them.
So what do these conservatives propose to do? What, in short,
does "counter-reform," or, as I would call it, "constitutional realignment" actually entail? Are there people straining to simply reverse a whole set of decisions beginning with Roe v. Wade' 9 and
running back perhaps as far as Everson v. Board of Education2 ° or even
Gitlow v. New York ?2
I think not. But here I am hobbled. I offer a single example,
which may suggest what pursuing a jurisprudence of original intention implies in a constitutional context in which original intention
has been ignored, not to say flouted, in the past. Justice Jackson
wrote in his dissent in Terminiello v. Chicago2 2 that
we should recall that our application of the First Amendment to Illinois rests entirely on authority which this Court
I recite the method by which the
has voted to itself ....
right to limit the state has been derived only from this
Court's own assumption of power, with never a submission
of legislation or amendment into which the people could
write any qualification to prevent abuse of this liberty [free
18. Id. at 136.
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion).
20. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding constitutionality of state statute that authorized
reimbursement from state funds to parents for transportation of children attending sectarian schools).
21. 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding constitutionality of state statute punishing utterances that advocated overthrow of organized government by violent and unlawful
means).
22. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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speech], as bearing upon the restraint I consider as becoming in the exercise of self-given and unappealable power.2 3
More recently, Attorney General Meese recalled to our attention the "shaky intellectual foundation" of incorporation.2 " He has
not, as far as I know, made any suggestion that Gitlow be overruled
or the clock be turned back to 1925. Certainly, I favor no such
thing. Stability is a value in constitutional law; some federal constitutional protection of free speech against acts of the state should be
considered in the category of "what's done is done." But it is surely
not forbidden to urge the Justices, when they consider acts of the
states alleged to infringe on federally protected speech, that they act
with that "restraint" which Justice Jackson thought "becoming."

23. Id. at 29 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
24. Moss, The Policy and Rhetoric of Ed Meese, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1987, at 64, 66 (quoting
Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III Before the ABA House of Delegates in
Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1985)).

